The bypass has a chokepoint: Bab el-Mandeb exposure across Gulf inbound lanes

Key findings

• Hormuz remains effectively closed to normal commercial traffic. IMF PortWatch recorded 2 transits on 25 October, against a pre-crisis baseline of about 85 a day (straits.live, citing IMF PortWatch).
• Jeddah Islamic Port handled 47% of Saudi merchandise imports, up from 22% a year earlier (AGBI).
• Bab el-Mandeb handled 1,215 transits in September 2026, 47% below pre-crisis levels. Houthi forces have held Mayyun Island, which splits the strait's two channels, since 11 September (House of Saud, citing Lloyd's List Intelligence).

How the Gulf is being supplied now

Shipping through Hormuz has been largely blocked since 28 February 2026 (Wikipedia: 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis). Before the war, Dammam and Jubail together handled more than a quarter of Saudi imports (AGBI). That flow has moved west and outside the Gulf.

Three gateway families now carry Gulf inbound trade:

Sources: trans.info on MSC; The Loadstar; Enterprise.

The exposure most maps miss

Cargo from Europe reaches Jeddah southbound through Suez and never touches Bab el-Mandeb. Cargo from China, India or Southeast Asia must enter the Red Sea from the south, through Bab el-Mandeb, to reach those same ports. The alternative is a voyage around Africa and back down through Suez.

So the Hormuz bypass has a hidden dependency. A Gulf importer that rerouted Asian supply to Jeddah has swapped one chokepoint for another, and the second is now contested. Two importers using the same Saudi port can carry completely different risk, depending on where their goods were loaded.

What changed since July

• 20 July: Houthi forces declared a naval ban on Saudi Arabia. Weekly Bab el-Mandeb transits fell from 354 to 269 in the following week, with tankers hit hardest (Lloyd's List Intelligence).
• 11 September: Houthi forces occupied Mayyun Island in the strait (House of Saud).
• September–October: Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk moved several Asia–Mediterranean services back from the Cape to the Red Sea (Al-Monitor). Most operators still treat southbound Saudi-linked transits as off-limits (Alupetra, citing S&P Global).

The result is a strait that is open to most traffic but selectively closed to Saudi-linked traffic. That is precisely the cargo the Red Sea bypass depends on.

Capacity is the second constraint

Saudi Red Sea ports had headroom: Jeddah's capacity exceeds 10m TEU against just over 3m TEU handled in 2024 (Enterprise). The binding limit is inland. The Saudi Landbridge railway is not built, so every container moves by road (The Loadstar). Shippers now report Red Sea ports operating at capacity ahead of seasonal import peaks (AGBI).

What procurement teams should do now

1. 01Split every inbound lane by origin and gateway. Asia to Saudi Red Sea is a Bab el-Mandeb lane. Europe to Saudi Red Sea is not.
2. 02Re-gateway Asia-origin critical goods to Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, Sohar or Salalah where onward road capacity allows.
3. 03Flag Saudi-linked carriers and consignees. The threat is targeted, so exposure follows the flag and the counterparty, not only the route.
4. 04Hold buffer stock for goods with a single viable gateway.

Method note

Transit counts from AIS-based sources understate real traffic: a growing share of escorted Hormuz transits sail without broadcasting AIS (UANI). Figures here are as reported by each named source on or before 1 November 2026. Re-check on publication; this situation changes weekly.